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Abstract
Big data platforms such as Hadoop and Spark are being widely adopted both by academia and industry. In this paper,
we propose a runtime intrusion detection technique that understands and works according to the properties of such
distributed compute platforms. The proposed method is based on runtime analysis of system and library calls and
memory access patterns of tasks running on the datanodes (slaves). First, the primary datanode of a big data system
creates a behavior profile for every task it executes. A behavior profile includes (a) trace of the system & library calls
made, and (b) sequence representing the sizes of private and shared memory accesses made during task execution. Then,
the process behavior profile is shared with other replica datanodes that are scheduled to execute the same task on their
copy of the same data. Next, these replica datanodes verify their local tasks with the help of the information embedded
in the received behavior profiles. This is realized in two steps: (i) comparing the system & library calls metadata, and
(ii) statistical matching of the memory access patterns. Finally, datanodes share their observations for consensus and
report an intrusion to the namenode (master) if they find any discrepancy. The proposed solution was tested on a small
hadoop cluster using the default MapReduce examples and the results show that our approach can detect insider attacks
that cannot be detected with the traditional analysis metrics.
Keywords: Big Data Platforms, Security Frameworks, Intrusion Detection, Memory Access, Calls
1. Introduction
The big data universe is growing aggressively with an
estimated market of 50 billion dollars by next year. Fig-
ure 1 shows the increase in market forecast in the last
five years. Big data platforms such as Hadoop [? ] and
Spark [? ] are being widely adopted both by academia
and industry. Security in these big data platforms is real-
ized by incorporating some traditional security measures
such as user authentication, access rights, activity logging
and data encryption [? ]. The end users have to trust
the providers of big data platforms that host their data.
Such trust is built on an underlying assumption that the
platforms or their security methods will never be compro-
mised. But unexpected issues such as insider attacks or
control-flow attacks due to programmer errors can happen
in any system anytime.
Insider attacks (in an organization) typically deal with
an employee stealing data using USB drives or by mas-
querading as another employee to gain access to unautho-
rized data [? ]. Such attacks are hard to detect and almost
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impossible to prevent. But with the increase in popularity
of concepts such as differential privacy in the big data uni-
verse, the biggest concern for these platforms is data loss or
data being stolen and hence they need to be able to iden-
tify an attack on the data as soon as it happens. In this25
regards, we believe that big data platforms might not need
brand new security methods but they need old methods to
be applied in new combinations and with new emphasis.
Our main focus is to identify such methods, modify them
according to the platform needs and test them thoroughly
before proposing to use them. In lieu of this, our previ-
ous works [? ? ? ] address some of the data security
concerns in big data platforms by proposing attack detec-
tion techniques that analyze compiled programs. But such
static analysis techniques have their limitations. For ex-
ample, they will not work if a datanode configuration is
changed by an insider or if a rogue datanode intention-
ally masquerades the information it shares. Hence, in this
work we propose a tighter intrusion detection technique
that is based on runtime analysis of processes, especially
their memory usage. This work is a full implementation
of our position paper [? ].
Typically in a big data cluster, when a user submits a
request, the namenode (master) creates a job and sched-
ules it for execution on the datanodes (slaves) that host
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Figure 1: Big Data Market Forecast [? ]
the required data for the job. When the job is scheduled
to execute at a datanode, static analysis techniques can
be run on the associated compiled binary or bytecode to
find vulnerabilities and bugs. Previously we proposed two
such static analysis techniques that use control flow infor-50
mation [? ? ]. These static analysis methods for intrusion
detection can help mitigate the effects of vulnerabilities
caused due to misplaced jumps, uninitialized arguments,
null pointers, dangling pointers (use after free), division
by zero etc.
Static analysis of a program binary helps in identifying
some attacks but vulnerabilities due to buffer-overflows,
shared libraries and dynamic linking will continue to ex-
ist even after static analysis. Memory corruption attacks
can be detected and prevented at runtime with the help
of sanitizers [? ]. But handling improper calls due to
programmer errors is still a difficult problem to address.
Another difficult attack scenario to address is insiders and
masqueraders in distributed environments such as cloud
and big data [? ]. Due to the distributed nature of big
data platforms and their requirement to provide data con-
sistency (with the help of replication), it is possible to per-
form dynamic analysis of processes for attack detection at
runtime and still prevent adverse outcomes such as data
loss.
1.1. Contributions of the proposed work
In this paper, we propose a distributed, runtime in-
trusion detection technique that understands and works
according to the properties of big data platforms. First,
a behavior profile is created by the primary datanode for75
every job it executes. This profile contains system & li-
brary call traces along with memory access patterns of the
process as observed during process execution. The meta-
data from the call traces is used to verify consistency in
call behavior among the datanodes. It can also be used for
checking against normal behavior, if that information ex-
ists. As for memory access patterns, Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) is used to observe orthogonal regression
among multiple memory mapping aspects. The result of
this analysis is a sequence that preserves the memory be-
havior of the datanode. Then, the process behavior profile
consisting information about call and memory behavior of
a datanode is shared with other replica datanodes that are
scheduled to run the same job on the same data. Next, the
replica datanodes verify the calls in their local process with
the call information given in the received profiles. The
replica datanodes also match the memory access pattern
of their local process with that of the received, by using
statistical analysis tests. Finally, datanodes share their
observations for consensus before reporting an intrusion
to the Namenode.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II gives some background about big data platforms and
runtime IDS. The various related works are also discussed
here. Section III describes the security issues we address100
in this work. Section IV presents the proposed intrusion
detection technique in detail. This section explains how
call information and memory access patterns are gathered
and matched for intrusion detection in a distributed sys-
tem setup. Experimental setup and results are thoroughly
discussed in Section V. Finally, Section VI draws the con-
clusions and outlines future work.
2. Background and Related Work
The four areas of security research that are closely re-
lated to this work are: (a) distributed intrusion detection
techniques, (b) tracing application behavior for security
in distributed systems, (c) handling vulnerabilities caused
by programmer errors and protection from insider attacks,
and (d) observing patterns in memory accesses made by
a process for finding anomalies in process behavior. The
other area of research used in this work is principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA).
2.1. Distributed Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are used to detect
anomalous or malicious usage in a computing device. Their
design is based on one of two ways: (a) knowledge from
prior attacks, and (b) learning from the behavior of pro-
grams and/or users. Knowledge-based IDS usually searches
a program for known threat signatures that are stored in
a database. With the drastic increase in the number of125
zero-day attacks, relying on a pre-populated database of
threats is unsuitable. Even if we assume to have an ideal
database of all possible threats, maintaining it would re-
quire a lot of resources and running search queries against
it would be expensive. On the other hand, behavior-based
IDS tries to model, analyze and compare user and/or ap-
plication behavior to identify anomalies. Network usage
(packets of data) is another common component observed
by such IDS. This technique needs more resources and is
more complex than signature-based IDS but it is more
effective in a dynamically changing threat environment.
Behavior-based IDS generally try to capture the context
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and apply statistics and rules on that context to detect
anomalies.
A distributed implementation of IDS is needed for sys-
tems that run on large clusters. Such an IDS would have
centralized control and can detect behavioral patterns even
in large networks. Efficient ways of data aggregation, com-
munication and cooperation are key factors of success for
such distributed IDS and it has to be employed at mul-
tiple levels: host, network and data [? ]. Hence, using
big data platforms to support general-purpose distributed
IDS implementations is a recommended and popular prac-
tice. But in this work, we concentrate on building an IDS
that can be used for security within a big data platform it-150
self. IDS within a big data platform favors behavior-based
distributed IDS because of the naturally large and ever
increasing scope of threats.
2.2. Tracing in Distributed Systems
The need for tools that can diagnose complex, dis-
tributed systems is high because the root cause of a prob-
lem can be associated to multiple events/components of
the system. Recent works in the distributed tracing do-
main are concentrating on providing an independent ser-
vice. Magpie [? ] works by capturing events in the dis-
tributed system and uses a model-based system to store
the traces. Xtrace [? ] provides a comprehensive view for
systems by reconstructing service behavior with the help
of metadata propagation. Though it has similarities to our
approach of providing task-centric causality, Xtrace con-
centrates on network level analysis. Retro [? ] is another
end-to-end tracing tool that audits resource usage along
execution path. The drawback with tools such as Xtrace
and Retro is that they are tightly coupled into the system
and hence need the user to modify source code. HTrace
[? ] is an Apache incubator project for distributed tracing
which requires adding some instrumentation to your ap-
plication. Pivot Trace [? ] is a dynamic causal monitoring
service for distributed systems that provides a happened-
before relation among discrete events. Fay [? ] is another175
distributed event tracing platform that instruments code
at runtime with safe extensions. G2 [? ] is a graph process-
ing system for diagnosing distributed systems. Finally, [?
] proposed an anomaly detection method for MapReduce
jobs in hadoop by collecting provenance data.
In this work, we are more interested in tracing sys-
tem & library calls. Detecting intrusions using system call
stack has been explored before. Hofmeyr et.al [? ] show
that short sequences of system calls executed by running
processes are a good discriminator between normal and
abnormal operating characteristics. Many models such as
Bayesian Classification, Hidden Markov Models (HMM)
and process algebra have been proposed for system call
sequence analysis [? ? ? ? ]. We use system and library
call metadata to build behavior profile of a process. This
is done by extracting information about system calls made
during runtime from the call stack. Also, information re-
lated to library calls is included in our behavior profiles
because big data frameworks use library calls that can be
completely accounted for. This aspect of our approach is
similar to AWS CloudTrail [? ] which enables user to
retrieve a history of API calls and other events for all of
the regions within the user’s account. Our work adopts
the call trace anomaly based intrusion detection idea and
modifies it to fit big data platforms accordingly.200
2.3. Programmer Errors and Insider Attacks
Programmer errors are a huge concern to security ar-
chitects because anticipating the vulnerabilities due to pro-
grammer errors is difficult but at the same time they can
give leeway to the attackers in their attempt to compro-
mise a system. Generally, vulnerabilities due to program-
mer errors can be mitigated by enforcing control-flow in-
tegrity [? ]. More specifically, programmer errors that
lead to memory corruptions can be handled by sanitizing
memory instructions [? ] in a program at compile-time.
Though this approach is very memory expensive, it seems
to work very efficiently for applications that run on a single
machine. Practical usage on real-time distributed applica-
tions is not feasible. But in this work we concentrate on a
subset of programmer errors that cannot be detected until
runtime. One popular way of detecting attacks due to such
vulnerabilities is by continuous monitoring of user and/or
application behavior. This is a technique that is widely
adopted by the industry in the recent past by leveraging
big data platforms.
Insider attacks are known to be difficult to detect and
prevent in general. This problem intensifies when the sys-
tem under consideration is deployed on a large, distributed
cluster. The ideal solution to detect and/or prevent in-
sider attacks is by automating every aspect of a system225
such that there is no human intervention at all but obvi-
ously this is not feasible. Especially for big data systems,
there is usually a service stack at the provider’s end and
another service stack at the client’s end. Hence, cloud
service providers such as Amazon and Google reduce the
scope for insiders by adopting a two step procedure: (a)
making most aspects of their systems to run automatically,
and (b) asking their clients to do the same.
2.4. Memory Access Patterns
Understanding memory access patterns of big data ap-
plications will help in profiling them from their data usage
perspective. Patterns in bandwidth usage, read/write ra-
tio or temporal and spatial locality can be used when ob-
serving memory accesses of a process. For example, W.Wei
et al. [? ] observed that memory access patterns of big
data workloads are similar to traditional parallel work-
loads in many ways but tend to have weak temporal and
spatial locality. One of the first works in characterizing
memory behavior of big data workloads was done by Dim-
itrov et al. [? ] who observed the characteristics such as
memory footprints, CPI, bandwidth etc. of the big data
workloads to understand the impact of optimization tech-
niques such as pre-fetching and caching. In distributed
3
compute systems, nodes of the cluster are typically virtual
machines. For example, a Hadoop datanode is a process250
which dynamically dispatches tasks every time a job is
scheduled. So, profiling the sizes of the private and shared
memory accesses of all tasks will give the memory access
pattern of the datanode.
2.5. Principal Component Analysis
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is an unsuper-
vised linear transformation technique that finds the direc-
tions of maximal variance in a given dataset [? ? ? ]. A
principal component is a linear combination of all the vari-
ables that retains maximal amount of information about
the variables. When used for fitting a linear regression,
PCA minimizes the perpendicular distances from the data
to the fitted model. This is the linear case of what is
known as orthogonal regression or total least squares [?
], and is appropriate when there is no natural distinction
between predictor and response variables. This is perfect
for our memory access pattern matching problem because
the features of memory access are all random and do not
follow any predictor-response relation.
According to the theory of orthogonal regression fitting
with PCA [? ], p observed variables can fit an r dimen-
sional hyperplane in p dimensional space where r is less
than equal to p. The choice of r is equivalent to choos-
ing the number of components to retain in PCA. For this
work, r and p are the same because we are not trying to re-275
duce the dimensionality. But to profile memory usage of a
process and later compare it with other profiles, we need a
function that can explain the memory behavior. For this,
we use the T-sqaured values that can be calculated using
PCA in the full space.
3. Threat Model
A software-centric threat model is used in this work
that dissects the big data platform design to understand
its operational vulnerabilities. The primary focus of this
work is to mitigate the effect of operational vulnerabilities
caused at runtime due to improper usage of system and
library calls by programmers. The reason for this choice is
two-fold: (a) impact of operational vulnerabilities due to
programmer errors cannot be estimated upfront, and (b)
programmer errors are usually considered to be resolved at
compile time. Our threat model also includes illegitimate
use of data access privileges by insiders. For example,
we want the proposed system to identify rogue datanodes
masquerading as normal datanodes. For this purpose, we
propose analyzing memory access patterns at process level.
But it is difficult to differentiate between unusual accesses
and corrupt accesses. For the scope of this work, we treat
both scenarios as threats. Some assumptions about the
system were made to fit this threat model.
• All datanodes use the same architecture, operating300
system and page size.
• The path to framework installation is the same on
all datanodes.
• The communication network will always be intact.
• The communication cost among replicas (slaves) is
at most the communication cost between namenode
(master) and datanodes (slaves).
4. Proposed Solution
In this section, we discuss the proposed solution for
detecting intrusions at runtime within the services pro-
vided by a big data platform. The motivation behind this
work came from the requirement to have a runtime detec-
tion algorithm in the system architecture we had proposed
previously [? ]. Our framework is currently equipped with
two compile time attack detection techniques [? ? ] pro-
posed by us in the past. Hence, for this work it is safe
to assume that the big data platform under consideration
is equipped with our secure detection framework that can
account for control-flow attacks that can be detected by
static analysis.
4.1. Process Behavior Profile
The first part of our proposed solution deals with build-
ing a behavior profile for every process running on a datan-
ode. Process behavior profiles can be built by observing a
variety of process characteristics. For this work, we are in-325
terested in designing the behavior of a process based on the
system & library calls and the memory accesses it makes
during its runtime. While system and library calls help
understand the work done by a process, memory accesses
talk about the data usage of a process.
Our solution merges the information from these two
aspects of a process - system & library calls and memory
access, to create a process behavior profile. This makes it
hard for the attackers to masquerade. The algorithm for
creating a process behavior profile is given in Algorithm 1.
The process behavior profile representing the datanode will
be a data structure with three entries: (1) identifier, (2)
map with one entry per call, and (3) t2, T-squared vector
from PCA on memory access information. The identifier
needs to be similar for a process across datanodes.
4.1.1. System & Library Calls
A call instruction in a program has the potential to take
the control away from program space to unknown territo-
ries. This property of a call instruction makes it an at-
tractive target for attackers. In this work we focus on two
specific kinds of call instructions known as the system calls
and library calls. The system calls are programmatic ways
of requesting a kernel service from the operating system.
The list of possible system calls is specific to the operating
system in use and the number of possible system calls is350
usually constant and limited. For example, Linux family
of operating systems have approximately 140 system calls
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[? ]. Since we specifically target big data platforms for
this work, it is implicit that a certain framework such as
hadoop or spark is installed on the cluster under surveil-
lance. The advantage of library call monitoring is that the
number of jars and shared library objects can be prede-
termined and these frameworks should have a predefined
installation path which will not change unless there is a
system level modification.
The problem with tracing system & library calls made
by a process at runtime is that the order in which these
calls are made might not persist across multiple runs of
the same program. But this is important to our secu-
rity framework since it tries to match information across
replica datanodes. So simply trying to perform an exact
match on the call stack will not work if we want to use call
information for intrusion detection in a distributed com-
puting domain. To combat this problem, we designed our
process behavior profile to be descriptive of the calls made
by a process. Instead of using the call stack, we extract
metadata about system & library calls from the call stack
and use that information for intrusion detection. Each row
in a process behavior profile representing a library or a sys-
tem call describes it using four fields: (a) full class name375
of the callee, (b) method signature, and (c) source code
line number and (d) count of the number of times this call
was made by the process. A hash of the full class name
is used as index for quick look-up. The other difficulty in
using call information for intrusion detection is that the
number of calls made by a process does not have to be the
same for different datanodes. But a huge variation in the
number of times a particular call is made can be used as
an indicator for intrusion.
4.1.2. Memory Accesses
While system & library calls help in profiling a process
and detect some attacks, they are susceptible to attacks as
well. For example, a rogue datanode can masquerade its
identity and send the process information to our security
framework before an attack is launched. This will lead to
a false negative scenario where the datanodes reach to a
consensus about a process even though a rogue node com-
promised a process. Also, system calls in call stack give
us the picture only until a file or device gets mapped to
memory. All further read() and write() calls are made on
the mapped memory using pointers. Hence, it is impor-
tant to have an alternate perspective about the process
in the behavior profile. Memory access information helps
in the fine granularity of event reconstruction. Memory
accesses during runtime give information about program400
characteristics such as the size of private and shared mem-
ory accessed by the program, number of clean and dirty
pages in program memory etc. There are many advantages
of using memory access patterns in behavior profiles, such
as:
(1) information can be gathered periodically.
(2) can be accomplished easily with hardware support.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to create process behavior pro-
file
1: procedure Behavior Profile
2: pid← get the process id of datanode
3: interval← set periodic interval for measurement
4: getProfile(pid):
5: Profile← empty map
6: Calls← call getCalls(pid)
7: MemAccess← call getMemAccess(pid)
8: Hash← hash of all call paths
9: Profile← insert([Hash, Calls], MemAccess)
10: return Profile
11: getCalls(pid):
12: while callstack(pid) = system or library call
do
13: callee← store the callee
14: signature← store the signature of the method
15: callPath← store the path
16: callCount← +1
17: hash← hash of the path
18: info← callee, signature, path, count
19: return map(hash, info)
20: getMemAccess(pid):
21: while elapsed=interval do
22: if smaps(j).type = private or shared then
23: thisAccess[0]← smaps(j).Rss
24: thisAccess[1]← smaps(j).Private
25: thisAccess[2]← smaps(j).Shared
26: MemAccess← add thisAccess
27: Result← call PCA(MemAccess)
28: return Result
(3) gives insight about the data aspects of a process.
(4) maintains differential privacy.
Today, most distributed systems are a cluster of nodes
in their abstract forms i.e. each node is a virtual ma-
chine or a process running on a virtual machine. Hence,
we designed our process behavior profile to include mem-
ory accesses made by the processes. The downside of this
approach, especially with modern operating systems such
as Linux, is that memory analysis becomes a complicated
topic. It is extremely difficult to know about how mem-
ory is organized inside a running process and how the
kernel handles the different allocation methods and pro-
cess forking. For example, most modern operating sys-
tems use copy-on-write semantics when forking a process
where child process address space is mapped to the same
backing pages (RAM) as the parent, except that when the
child attempts to write to one of those pages, the kernel
transparently copies the memory contents to a new, dedi-425
cated page, before carrying out the write. This approach
speeds up the forking procedure but complicates the mem-
ory analysis.
Usually, the kernel delays the actual allocation of phys-
ical memory until the time of the first access. Hence, know-
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ing the actual size of physical memory used by a process
(known as resident memory of the process) is only known
to the kernel. This memory mapping information from
the kernel can be used to analyze the memory pattern of
processes. A mapping is a range of contiguous pages hav-
ing the same back-end (anonymous or file) and the same
access modes. For this work, features of memory map-
ping that are relatively straight forward to analyze were
chosen. The private and shared pages of a process in the
RAM are observed as parts of memory access patterns.
Private memory always belongs just to the process be-
ing observed while shared memory may be shared with its
parent and/or children processes. In theory, the number
of pages allocated to a process should be equal to the sum
of its shared and private pages. To alleviate the penalty of
constant monitoring, we gather this information periodi-
cally for every 2 seconds.
Two simple and typical big data work flows are used
to demonstrate the insights provided by system calls and
memory accesses of a process. The first example is about450
writing a 3GB file to HDFS in a Hadoop cluster. Figure
2a shows the results of principal component analysis on
memory mappings (t2) of the datanodes. The 3 dimension
plot in Figure 2b shows orthogonal regression among prin-
cipal components which are calculated from observations
made from memory mapping sizes of a datanode. The
three dimensions used in this graph are the three different
measurements taken at process level - resident set, private
pages and shared pages. The red line indicates that the
pages in RAM for a process are a combination of its pri-
vate and shared pages. One observation or data point that
seems to be an outlier. This can be due to multiple rea-
sons such as swapping or giving away allocated memory to
other processes in need etc. Table 1 has the results of f-
test performed on t2 statistic calculated as a result of PCA
on the sample memory observations made during this test.
A random sample of the smallest and largest memory ac-
cesses are taken into consideration for this test. Though
this is atypical for statistical tests, the intent of this ex-
Table 1: Results of F-Test on Hotelling’s T-squared statis-
tic (t2) from PCA when Datanodes are idle
F-
Test
Nodes
1 & 2
Nodes
1 & 3
Nodes
2 & 3
h 0 0 0
p 0.66 0.74 0.9
ample is to show that the null hypothesis holds true. The
first row in the table (h = 0) indicates the test accepts the
null hypothesis. Here the null hypothesis is that the data
comes from normal distributions with the same variance.
The alternative hypothesis is that the population variance
in memory access sizes of a datanode is greater than that475
of the other datanode. The second row of the table, p
values, are very high (> 0.5) and imply confidence on the
validity of the null hypothesis that variance in memory ac-
cess is equal for all datanodes. The second example shows
the simplest case with a hadoop cluster. Figure 2c gives an
insight to the system and library calls made by datanodes
when they are idle i.e., no user submitted jobs but just
maintenance. Each slave node made a total of 275 system
calls during the time of observation. The calls and their
frequencies were consistent across all data nodes. This can
be observed with the overlapping call frequency patterns
in Figure 2c. Whether we consider the call information of
idle nodes or the memory access information when putting
a file in HDFS, it can be concluded that the datanodes are
in harmony.
Representing memory access pattern as a sequence of
access size and using approximate string comparison or
edit distance is one way to measure similarity between pat-
terns. But there are many aspects to a memory access and
creating a memory access profile with fine grained detail
preserves more information for comparison across different
machines. A straightforward comparison of all observed
memory features is redundant and not always feasible.
Hence, we chose to use an approximation method using
multiple features when creating and comparing a process500
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profile than using just one feature. In this work, each ac-
cess pattern includes information about three features of
a process memory access: (a) size of resident pages in the
RAM for the mapping, (b) size of shared pages in that
mapping, and (c) size of private pages in the same map-
ping. We use PCA to fit the measured 3 dimensional data
as linear regression and share the resultant t2 information
for comparing and verifying memory access patterns of
two datanodes. PCA calculates three metrics for a given
sample dataset: coefficients, scores and mean. The
coefficients of a principal component are given in descend-
ing order of component variance calculated by the singular
value decomposition (SVD) algorithm [? ]. This is calcu-
lated using Equation 1 where X is a principal component,
λ is the eigenvalue and Y is the eigenvector. The sample
means, x¯ with n observed memory access sizes per process
is calculated using Equation 2 where xi is an individual
memory access size from datanode x. The sample vari-
ances, σ2x is calculated using Equation 3 with n−1 degrees
of freedom. Since our measurements use multiple features
of a memory access, covariances are the eigenvalues of the
covariance matrix of input data and they can be calcu-
lated using Equation 4 where Wx1,x2 is the covariance in
two features of memory access of datanodes x. Here xi,1
is the memory access size of the ith observation for the525
first memory feature. When observing k memory features,
we would have an array of values [xi,1, xi,2...xi,k] for each
observation. Scores are the representations of the input
data in the principal component space. The t2 values can
be calculated from the memory patterns on each datanode
using Equation 5. But using PCA, the t2 values are cal-
culated as sum of squares distance from the center of the
transformed space. Upon having the t2 values, difference
between them can be calculated using one way analysis of
variance as given in Equation 6 where the null hypothesis
is that all group means are equal. Here, t2x is the t-squared
vector for datanode x, t2y is the t-squared vector for datan-
ode y and p is the probability that the means of t2x and t
2
y
are the same.
X = λ1/2Y (1)
x¯ =
∑n1
i=1 xi
n1
(2)
σ2x =
∑n
i=1(x¯− xi)
n− 1 (3)
Wx1,x2 =
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
(xi,1 − x¯)(xi,2 − x¯)T (4)
t2x = n(x¯− µ)TW−1x (x¯− µ) (5)
p = anova(t2x, t
2
y) (6)
Algorithm 2 Algorithm to verify process behavior pro-
file
1: procedure Verify Profile
2: pid← get the process id from datanode
3: Local← behavior profile from this node
4: Recv← behavior profiles from other nodes
5: compare():
6: for thread t in pid do
7: result1← call CompareCalls(t)
8: result2← call CompareMemAccess(p)
9: result← result1 & result2
10: notify result . similarity in calls & memory
accesses
11: CompareCalls(t):
12: for call c in t do
13: if hash(cpath) = Recv.find() then
14: if count(cLocal) count(cRecv) then
15: return true
16: else
17: return false
18: CompareMemAccess(pid):
19: if compare(t2Recv, t
2
Local) then
20: return true
21: else
22: return false
Algorithm 3 Algorithm to compare process behavior
profiles
1: procedure Compare Profiles
2: t2Local ← get the process profile from datanode
3: t2Recv ← received process profiles
4: for all t2i do
5: filter(t2i ) . remove tailing t
2 values
6: sort(t2i )
7: if Anova(t2Local, t
2
Recv) then
8: compromised← Tukey(t2Local, t2Recv)
9: return true
10: else
11: return false
4.2. Dynamic Verifier Function
The dynamic verifier function is a part of the replica
datanodes. It is used to parse a received behavior profile
and use the extracted information to verify a local process.
It will help in identifying process-level anomalies between
two replica datanodes. We propose two algorithms as part
of anomaly detection: (1) Algorithm 2 is the generic verifi-
cation algorithm that indicates an anomaly among process
behavior profiles, and (2) Algorithm 3 is the comparison
algorithm for differentiating between two or more memory
access patterns. The system & library calls information550
is given in a hash map data structure with call as the id
and call path as the value. Finding differences at call path
level is simple because the lookup() function on the map
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Figure 3: A secure framework for hosting the proposed IDS [? ]
will return the path in constant time. For every call made
locally by a datanode, the call path is hashed using SHA-1
hashing algorithm and the hash map of calls received from
the replica datanodes is looked up for the same hash in
its index set. This lookup is quick and a mismatch (or)
lack of match indicates that the datanodes used different
set of system or library calls to perform the same task.
This is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to indi-
cate an intrusion. The additional information about calls
available in the behavior profile helps in solidifying the
attack detection process. The difference in the number of
times a system or library call is called to perform the same
task should be less than a predefined threshold, δ, when
comparing processes from different datanodes.
Memory pattern of a process is represented using t2
values of PCA. Since the t2 values follow F-distribution, a
comparison among memory patterns can be performed in
two steps: (a) by running ANOVA test on the t2 vectors
to check if the patterns are different, and (b) by running
Tukey test on the results from the ANOVA test to find
the attacked datanode. This can also be accomplished
by any other tests that assess the equality of variances575
such as F-test, Levene’s test or Bartlett’s test. In case of
ANOVA, if the p-value is low (< 0.05) then it confirms
the rejection of the null hypothesis with strong statistical
significance. Then, a multiple comparison test such as a
Tukey test is used to check if the difference in the means
of the t2 values is significant. One big shortcoming of our
approach is that it does not help in distinguishing between
unusual process behavior from corrupt behavior. To be
able to overcome such shortcomings, techniques such as
reinforcement learning need to be used and we leave that
for future work.
4.3. System Architecture
The proposed intrusion detection algorithm needs a
strong framework to support it. For this purpose, we
reuse the security framework we proposed previously for
compile-time intrusion detection in big data platforms [?
? ]. Figure 3 shows a high level design of the framework.
This framework is equipped with an inter-node, key-based
secure communication protocol. All the messages among
the datanodes are encrypted and use this communication
protocol. The framework is assumed to be hosted on a
coprocessor that communicates with the CPU for receiv-
ing the input data. Though a detailed design for such a
coprocessor is not given, we believe that an ASIC based
design would be a good idea for our coprocessor. It is as-600
sumed that the communication between the coprocessor
and the main processor uses a secure protocol such as the
one used by Apple processors to communicate with the
secure enclave coprocessor [? ]. Adding new security in-
structions to the instruction set of a regular processor can
also suffice. The other two elements of this framework are
the process profiling phase and verification & consensus
phase. Algorithms 1, 2 and 3 are hosted and used for this
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purpose. The distributed nature of our algorithms help in
conducting the profiling phase and the verification phase
independently at each datanode in the cluster. This helps
a lot in reducing the time taken for intrusion detection. At-
tack notification is sent from the primary datanode to the
master node when there is a consensus among the datan-
odes about the existence of an attack. This consensus can
be established using one of the popular leader election al-
gorithms or consensus algorithms such as raft and paxos
[? ].
5. Experiments and Results
To test the proposed solution, we set-up a small Ama-
zon EC2 cluster with 3 datanodes, 1 Namenode and 1
Secondary Namenode. Replication factor of the cluster is
set to 3 (default). EC2 m4.xlarge instances we used for
hosting the cluster. Each node was running Ubuntu 14.04
and was equipped with a 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2676 v3625
(Haswell) processor, 4 virtual cores and 16 GB of memory.
In order to simulate a compromised cluster, one of
the datanodes was explicitly programmed as the corrupt
datanode. This was achieved by using two synthetic intru-
sions given in Table 2. These synthetic intrusions represent
different kinds of insider attacks such as: (a) misusing the
system access privilege and modifying the system configu-
ration, (b) misusing the data access privilege and copying
user data for personal benefits, and (c) misusing the data
access privilege and sharing or deleting sensitive user data
as revenge against the system. Four of the sixteen hadoop
examples that come by default with hadoop installation
were used for demonstrating the results. A list of the
MapReduce examples used along with a brief description
is given in Table 3. Tests are conducted by running the
hadoop map-reduce examples one at a time on the cluster.
Observations from each data node are logged periodically
(every 2 seconds) and later analyzed using our framework.
Statistical analysis and graphs were generated using Mat-
lab software [? ].
Two aspects of a process - system & library calls and
memory accesses are observed while running the Hadoop
MapReduce examples on the cluster. The call stack of the
process running on the data nodes is monitored. For li-
brary & system call information, we get the path at the650
which the concerned jar file or shared library is located.
For memory access pattern, we get the (a) memory foot-
print of a process by observing the number of pages ref-
erenced by the process, and (b) memory consumption of
the process’s mappings. The memory consumption can
be calculated by looking at the the size of the mapping
that is currently resident in RAM and the size of mem-
ory currently marked as referenced or accessed. In this
work, we used the information available through smaps
which only reports about memory pages that are actually
in RAM. The memory consumptions of datanode processes
are monitored by reading the values from smaps of all pro-
cesses or tasks running on the datanode. There is a series
Table 2: Two synthetic intrusions for testing our proposed
solution
Synthetic
Intrusion
Description
Modify the
configuration
Change the configuration on
one of the datanodes. For
example, allocate less heap
space to slowdown process ex-
ecution.
Copy and share
data
Access HDFS using a script
and make unauthorized per-
sonal copies. Share the data
using third party service like
mail client.
Table 3: List of Hadoop Map-Reduce examples used in
this work
Exp.
Name
Description
Random
text
writer
A map/reduce program that writes
10GB of random textual data per
node.
Aggregate
word
count
An Aggregate based map/reduce
program that counts the words in the
input files.
Teragen Generate one terabyte of randomly
distributed data.
Terasort Sort one terabyte of randomly
distributed data.
of lines in the smaps file of a process for each mapping
such as the following: Size, Rss, Pss, Shared Clean, Shared
Dirty, Private Clean, Private Dirty, Referenced, Anony-
mous, KernelPageSize, MMUPageSize, Locked. For proof
of concept, we picked three of these features: Rss, Shared
(clean and dirty), Private (clean and dirty) because in the-
ory Rss should sum up to the combined value of shares and
private.
5.1. Experiments
A common problem for big data related academic re-
searchers is the relative lack of high-quality intrusion de-
tection data sets [? ]. This is a much bigger problem if the675
attacks under consideration are not network related. So,
we decided to create our own synthetic attacks. Once the
system was setup, two synthetic insider attacks were per-
formed on system while it was executing the four Hadoop
MapReduce examples to emulate normal usage of the ser-
vices.
5.1.1. Attack 1: Modifying the node configuration
This attack involves exploitation of access privileges
by an insider who is legally allowed to access the sys-
tem and its configuration files. An insider who is a sys-
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(a) CPU utilization (b) Network In (c) Network out
Figure 4: Results of monitoring the usual metrics of datanodes for teragen after a replica was compromised (source:
Amazon EC2)
(a) CPU utilization (b) Network In (c) Network out
Figure 5: Results of monitoring the usual metrics of datanodes for terasort after a replica was compromised (source:
Amazon EC2)
tem admin can modify the configuration properties of a
datanode to intentionally impact the performance of the
overall system. To implement this attack, we made the
system admin change the datanode configuration through
the hdfs-site.xml file on of the datanodes of the hadoop
cluster. The amount of memory allocated for non-DFS
purposes on the datanode were increased by 25% and the
number of server threads for the datanode were reduced by
changing the handler count to 2. Since this is a one-time
modification made by an authorized user whose job entails
modification of the configuration files, usual user-profiling
will not help in detecting the attack.
5.1.2. Attack 2: Illicit copying of data
This attack involves two cases: (a) the use of non-
certified (and untrusted) equipment to transfer data from700
one machine to another, and (b) the use of certified and
trusted software (such as a mail client) to transfer data
from one machine to another. Similar to the previous
attack, the first step involved in this attack is for the
system admin to modify the configuration through the
hdfs-site.xml file on of the datanodes of the Hadoop
cluster. A new location local to the system admin account
is added to the DFS data directory property. As a result,
all blocks at this datanode have two copies - one copy in
the actual HDFS location used while setting up the clus-
ter and another duplicate copy in the system admin’s local
folder. Next, a script is used to simulate an insider peri-
odically transferring these duplicates files from his local
folder of to another remote location using the mail client
service or USB device. Since it is not possible for us to
connect a USB device to Amazon EC2 instances, we in-
cluded the system calls involved with using such a device
in the attack script.
5.1.3. Results from Hadoop
The results of the Hadoop MapReduce examples are
given in Table 4. Terasort and Teragen examples were run
on a terabyte of data while Random text writer and aggre-
gate word counter used a little more than 10GB of data.
Because of this variation in data size, it can be noticed that
the time taken to complete these examples also changed725
accordingly. To generate the terabyte of input data, Ter-
agen took 109 seconds while Terasort took more than 6
times that amount (695 seconds) to sort the terabyte of
data. Random text writer took 22.5 seconds to generate
random words of size 10GB and Aggregate word count
took just 14 seconds to count the words in that 10GB of
input data.
5.1.4. Results from Proposed Method
While the hadoop MapReduce examples were execut-
ing the way they are supposed to, our security framework
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performed its analysis on the datanodes that were con-
tributing to the successful execution of those MapReduce
examples.
Attack 1 Results (Modifying a datanode configuration):
It can be noticed from Figures 4 and 5 that the Amazon
EC2 cluster monitoring metrics such as CPU utilization,
Network traffic (bytes in and out) were unable to detect
the insider attack while running the Terasort and Teragen
examples. But the results from our method for the same
Hadoop examples clearly indicate that there is an intru-
sion in the system, as noticed in Figures 6 and 7. ANOVA
on the t2 vectors from the datanodes indicates that one of
the datanodes has a different distribution compared to the
other two. This can be observed in the p− value column
of Table 4. In all four examples, the p−value is extremely750
low and indicates strong rejection of the null hypothesis
that the means of the three different distributions are sim-
ilar. The multiple comparison test proves that the means
of these distributions are not equal and that datanode 1 (in
blue) is the one that is different from the other two datan-
odes (in red). Figures 6a - d show the results of ANOVA
and Figures 7a - d show the results of multiple comparison
test. Interestingly, the call frequency on all nodes for these
examples seemed to follow similar patterns and the num-
ber of distinct library calls made by a datanode is always
constant. So if we just consider call frequency analysis for
threat detection, this attack is an example of false posi-
tive. But it is the system call frequency that hints at the
possibility of an attack. Since the memory size and the
number of threads for datanode1 were reduced and com-
pared to the other two datanodes, it can be noticed that
the system calls (calls to the stack) are relatively low for
datanode1 in all examples. This can be observed in Figure
8.
Attack 2 Results (Illicit copying of data): Since our
test setup uses Amazon EC2, we cannot use a USB drive
to copy files. Instead we tried to access data from the
/dev folder because all nodes in the cluster are running
on Linux operating system. It must be noted that for this
kind of attack, it is not required to perform an action (run775
an example) to notice that the system has been compro-
mised. Hence, this analysis is performed when the system
is idle. A script used for encrypting and sending files in
RAM disks as mail attachments to system admin’s per-
sonal email account. Each file is 4MB in size and it is
zipped before sending out as mail attachment. This leads
to a difference in the call frequency pattern of the datan-
ode, as observed in Figure 9. It can be observed from
the call frequency in Figures 9a and 9b that compromised
datanode i.e. datanode1’s call frequency is order of mag-
nitude more when compared to datenode2 and datanode3
which were not compromised.
5.2. Analysis and Observations
The time complexity of PCA is O(p2n + p3) where n
is the number of observations and p is the number of vari-
ables in the original dataset. In our case, p = 3 and even
if we generalize, the value of p will be some constant k be-
cause it represents the number of features in memory to be
observed. Also, this constant k will be much smaller than
n. So, the time complexity of PCA in our case should be
approximately O(n) i.e., linearly dependent on the number
of observations made.
In case of memory pattern analysis, if the tails in the
observed populations have considerably larger values com-
pared to the mean of the non-tail data, then those data800
points will have an impact on the output of variance anal-
ysis tests such as ANOVA. Hence, it is important to first
filter out such data points before running the analysis test.
In case of call analysis, there cannot be a concrete conclu-
sion about the system being attacked based only on fre-
quency of calls obtained from different datanodes. Hence,
one can conclude that a combination of both of these meth-
ods along with other traditional security methods is needed
to keep the system safe.
Intrusion detection methods need to account for the
following:
(1) True Positive: successful identification of anomalous
or malicious behavior. Our framework achieves this
for all data attacks because accessing data involves
memory allocation or reference.
(2) True Negative: successful identification of normal or
expected behavior. Our framework achieved this when
tested on idle datanodes.
(3) False Positive: normal or expected behavior is iden-
tified as anomalous or malicious. Our framework will
have this problem if the the memory mapping observa-
tions are not properly cleaned (as mentioned above).
A false positive in our framework might also occur
when there is a delay in the communication among
datanodes about the profile.825
(4) False Negative: anomalous or malicious behavior should
have been identified but the framework could not. This
case arises if the all duplicate datanodes in the big
data cluster are attacked by an insider at once. Luck-
ily, this is highly unlikely to happen in case of large,
distributed big data clusters. Other traditional secu-
rity mechanisms in place will be able to prevent such
cases from happening [? ? ].
6. Conclusion
This work is a full implementation of our previous pro-
posal [? ]. In this work, we propose a technique to mitigate
vulnerabilities and detect attacks during runtime within
big data platforms. Our proposed technique analyzes sys-
tem & library calls along with memory accesses of a pro-
cess, packs all of the analysis information together as a
process behavior profile and shares that profile with other
replica datanodes in the system. The replica datanodes
verify the received call traces and access patterns with
their local processes for attack detection. Experimental
results show that our approach can detect insider attacks
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Table 4: Information and experimental results for Hadoop MapReduce examples
Example Data Size Time
No. of observations
Sum of F p-value
(Bytes) (seconds) Node1 Node2 Node3 Squares Statistic
Teragen 10000000000 109.313 58770 59970 60114 0.129 102.95 2.1 e−45
Terasort 10000000000 694.966 118940 127310 124088 0.256 162.19 3.9 e−71
Random Text Writer 1102236330 22.543 29681 31850 31025 0.094 48.64 7.7 e−22
Aggregate Word Count 1102250820 14.347 29675 31850 31157 0.069 37.29 6.4 e−17
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Figure 6: Results showing difference in Memory Mappings ANOVA on t2 of 3 datanodes after a replica was compromised.
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Figure 7: Results showing difference in Memory Mappings Tukey on t2 of 3 datanodes after a replica was compromised.
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Figure 8: Results showing similarity in Calls of 3 datanodes after a replica was compromised by attack 1.
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Figure 9: Results showing difference in calls from 3 datanodes after a replica was compromised by attack 2.
even in cases where the usual CPU and network analysis
fail to do so, when tested on Hadoop MapReduce exam-
ples.
For future work, we would like to explore security and
privacy of user data for big data platforms that specifi-850
cally support machine learning algorithms and differential
privacy.
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Appendix A. Changing the configuration of HDFS
on a hadoop datanode
The hdfs-site.xml file on a datanode has the HDFS
configuration details. With hadoop distribution version
2.7.1 there are 20 properties that can be set for HDFS on a
datanode. These include details about threads, read/write
policies, memory & cache allocations and their policies.
Changing the contents of this file on one of the datanodes
is a insider job that affects the performance of the overall
cluster but cannot be detected easily. For this work, we
played around with some of the HDFS properties such as
having an additional local folder to save all data processed
by the datanode, reducing the size of memory allocated
for HDFS on the datanode, changing the thread handler
count used by the datanode and drastically decreasing the
revocation polling time for the datanode.
Appendix B. Using external devices on Linux875
Successfully opening a device file name (e.g. /dev/xvda1,
/dev/loop0) establishes a link between a file descriptor and
an attached device. In case of Amazon EC2 nodes, we typ-
ically find Xen disk storage devices, RAM disks or loop
devices because it is a virtual machine. Value of a sym-
bolic link to a device can be obtained using a command
such as: sudo readlink -f /dev/input/by-path/* to
access input devices, sudo readlink -f /dev/loop* to
access loop devices, sudo readlink -f /dev/ram* to ac-
cess ram disks. These symbolic links can be used by most
system calls. Commands such as dd can be used to con-
vert and copy these files. The associated driver maintains
state information and resources at both the device and
the file descriptor levels. The possible system calls are:
ioctls(); open(); write(); read(); poll(); close(); mmap();
and fcntl(). The number of possible error codes are also
limited.
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